

Web Appendix Table 1. Roll Call Votes for Calculating *Tough on Crime*

Year	Roll no.	<i>Tough on Crime</i> Position	Bill	Year	Roll no.	<i>Tough on Crime</i> Position	Bill
1987	348	N	H R 3307	1993	540	N	H R 3350
1988	105	Y	H AMDT 669	1993	543	N	H R 3354
1988	298	Y	H AMDT 870	1993	590	N	H R 3351
1988	299	N	H AMDT 876	1994	104	Y	H AMDT 499
1988	300	Y	H AMDT 875	1994	106	N	H AMDT 501
1988	301	Y	H AMDT 877	1994	107	N	H AMDT 503
1988	315	Y	H AMDT 879	1994	109	Y	H AMDT 505
1988	322	Y	H AMDT 887	1994	119	Y	H AMDT 507
1988	331	Y	H AMDT 905	1994	122	Y	H AMDT 509
1988	332	Y	H R 5210	1994	124	Y	H AMDT 512
1988	465	Y	H R 5210	1994	126	N	H AMDT 515
1990	410	N	H R 5269	1994	130	Y	H AMDT 516
1990	413	Y	H AMDT 823	1994	131	Y	H AMDT 517
1990	414	Y	H AMDT 825	1994	144	N	H R 4092
1990	418	Y	H AMDT 830	1994	416	N	H R 3355
1990	422	N	H AMDT 834	1995	98	N	H AMDT 99
1990	423	Y	H AMDT 835	1995	99	N	H AMDT 100
1990	424	Y	H AMDT 838	1995	103	Y	H R 666
1990	427	Y	H R 5269	1995	104	N	H AMDT 108
1991	311	N	H AMDT 311	1995	105	N	H AMDT 109
1991	313	Y	H AMDT 322	1995	109	Y	H R 729
1991	316	Y	H AMDT 325	1995	111	N	H AMDT 116
1991	319	Y	H AMDT 328	1995	117	Y	H R 667
1991	320	Y	H AMDT 329	1995	124	N	H AMDT 158
1991	322	Y	H AMDT 332	1995	129	Y	H R 728
1991	324	Y	H AMDT 335	1995	723	N	H AMDT 878
1991	327	N	H R 3371	1995	724	N	H R 2259
1991	443	N	H R 3371	1995	725	Y	H R 2259

1996	434	Y	H R 3852	2002	64	Y	H R 2146
1997	111	N	H AMDT 74	2002	255	Y	H R 4679
1997	112	N	H AMDT 75	2002	259	Y	H R 4477
1997	114	N	H AMDT 77	2002	446	Y	H R 5422
1997	115	N	H AMDT 78	2003	87	Y	H AMDT 19
1998	436	Y	S 2073	2003	88	Y	H AMDT 25
1999	211	Y	H AMDT 180	2003	89	Y	H R 1104
1999	213	Y	H AMDT 182	2003	608	Y	H R 3214
1999	233	Y	H R 1501	2004	497	Y	H R 5107
2000	496	Y	H R 4365				

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Web Appendix Table 2. Interactive Effect of *Tough on Crime* and Racial Composition of the District on Incumbent Vote Share

	Democrats		Republicans	
	Higher Saliency Years	Lower Saliency Years	Higher Saliency Years	Lower Saliency Years
<i>Tough on Crime</i>	0.054 (0.016)	0.007 (0.008)	0.003 (0.026)	0.002 (0.008)
<i>Tough on Crime x 5% African American</i>	0.001 (0.019)	-0.014 (0.009)	-0.024 (0.035)	0.004 (0.010)
<i>5% African American</i>	0.004 (0.008)	0.017 (0.006)	0.007 (0.035)	-0.007 (0.010)
<i>De-crimed ADA</i>	-0.072 (0.021)	-0.079 (0.017)	0.121 (0.022)	0.130 (0.018)
<i>Presidential Vote Share</i>	0.672 (0.031)	0.449 (0.021)	0.478 (0.038)	0.386 (0.032)
<i>ln(Challenger Spending) – ln(Incumbent Spending)</i>	-0.028 (0.002)	-0.026 (0.002)	-0.025 (0.002)	-0.024 (0.001)
<i>Challenger Quality</i>	-0.027 (0.006)	-0.021 (0.006)	-0.021 (0.007)	-0.013 (0.005)
<i>Freshman</i>	-0.017 (0.006)	0.007 (0.005)	-0.016 (0.006)	-0.008 (0.005)
<i>Rate of Violent Crime</i>	-0.079 (0.012)	-0.031 (0.009)	0.038 (0.011)	-0.011 (0.007)
<i>Change in Rate of Violent Crime</i>	-0.312 (0.061)	0.237 (0.055)	0.161 (0.054)	-0.149 (0.039)
Constant	0.260 (0.024)	0.426 (0.016)	0.897 (0.032)	0.750 (0.017)
N	512	1056	468	879
R <sup>2</sup>	0.812	0.624	0.638	0.527

Notes: Each entry reports the estimated coefficient and the robust estimate of its standard error. *Higher Saliency Years* defined in text. *5% African American* is a dichotomous variable that equals one if at least five percent of the district is African American.

Web Appendix Table 3. Instrumental Variables Analysis for Challenger Quality

	Democrats		Republicans	
	Higher Salience Years	Lower Salience Years	Higher Salience Years	Lower Salience Years
<b>Crime</b>				
<i>2<sup>nd</sup> stage equation key results</i>				
<i>Tough on crime score</i>	0.058 (0.012)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.008 (0.019)	0.009 (0.006)
<i>Challenger Quality</i>	-0.028 (0.022)	-0.035 (0.016)	-0.044 (0.014)	-0.051 (0.015)
<i>1<sup>st</sup> stage equation key results (excluded instruments)</i>				
<i>Congressional delegation size</i>	-0.009 (0.007)	-0.011 (0.005)	-0.016 (0.007)	-0.006 (0.005)
<i>Biennial state legislature</i>	-0.563 (0.280)	0.038 (0.160)	0.171 (0.335)	0.236 (0.200)
<i>War chest</i>	-0.082 (0.418)	-0.336 (0.296)	-0.460 (0.700)	0.149 (0.239)
N	512	1045	468	864
Wald test of independence of equations	$\chi^2_{[1]}=0.01$ ( $p=0.919$ )	$\chi^2_{[1]}=0.75$ ( $p=0.387$ )	$\chi^2_{[1]}=2.67$ ( $p=0.103$ )	$\chi^2_{[1]}=5.22$ ( $p=0.022$ )
<b>Environment</b>				
<i>2<sup>nd</sup> stage equation key results</i>				
<i>LCV score</i>	-0.031 (0.028)	0.012 (0.012)	0.094 (0.020)	-0.017 (0.013)
<i>Challenger Quality</i>	-0.048 (0.017)	-0.012 (0.020)	-0.046 (0.012)	-0.048 (0.017)
<i>1<sup>st</sup> stage equation key results (excluded instruments)</i>				
<i>Congressional delegation size</i>	-0.021 (0.008)	-0.006 (0.003)	-0.018 (0.007)	-0.011 (0.004)
<i>Biennial state legislature</i>	-0.353 (0.348)	-0.110 (0.162)	0.868 (0.348)	0.004 (0.188)
<i>War chest</i>	-0.405 (0.364)	-0.245 (0.302)	0.061 (0.360)	-0.098 (0.236)
N	301	1256	337	992
Wald test of independence of equations	$\chi^2_{[1]}=0.00$ ( $p=0.950$ )	$\chi^2_{[1]}=0.18$ ( $p=0.670$ )	$\chi^2_{[1]}=7.46$ ( $p=0.006$ )	$\chi^2_{[1]}=3.52$ ( $p=0.061$ )

Notes: Dependent variable of the 2<sup>nd</sup> stage equation equals two-party vote share and of the 1<sup>st</sup> stage equation equals Challenger Quality. Each entry reports the estimated coefficient and the robust estimate of its standard error using the Maddala (1983) maximum likelihood estimator for the effect of an endogenous binary variable on a continuous dependent variable. Salience defined for each issue as in the text. All standard controls for the text are included; results of the control variables available upon request.

Web Appendix Table 4. Matching Analysis for *Tough on Crime* Treatment of 50 percent, Democrats

	<b>Estimate (Std. Error)</b>	<b>Fitness Value</b>	<b>Std. Diff. in Means for Propensity Scores</b>	<b>Total <i>n</i> Treated <i>n</i></b>
<b>Years</b>	<b>[1]</b>	<b>[2]</b>	<b>[3]</b>	<b>[4]</b>
1994- 1998	0.031 (0.013)	0.157	0.028	508 137
1988- 1992 & 2000- 2004	-0.002 (0.007)	0.058	0.005	991 485

Notes: All analyses include as co-variates *De-crimes ADA*, which is adjusted to be used across Congresses by the Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder (1999) method; *Presidential Vote Share*; *% African American*;  $\ln(\text{Challenger Spending}) - \ln(\text{Incumbent Spending})$ ; *Challenger Quality*; *Freshman*; *Rate of Violent Crime*; and *Change in Rate of Violent Crime*.

Web Appendix Table 5. Placebo Tests: The Effect of *Tough on Crime* on *Lagged Vote Share*

	<b>Estimate (Std. Err.)</b>	<b>Fitness Value</b>	<b>Std. Diff. in Propensity Score Means</b>	<b>Total <i>n</i> Treated <i>n</i></b>
<b>Democrats in Years</b>	<b>[1]</b>	<b>[2]</b>	<b>[3]</b>	<b>[4]</b>
1994-1998	-0.026 (0.017)	0.474	-0.034	481 28
1988-1992 & 2000-2004	-0.005 (0.011)	0.195	0.047	701 199
<b>Republicans In Years</b>				
1994-1998	-0.013 (0.014)	0.317	0.014	442 65
1988-1992 & 2000-2004	-0.012 (0.013)	0.179	0.001	634 125

Notes: All analyses include as co-variables *De-crimes ADA*, which is adjusted to be used across Congresses by the Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder (1999) method; *Presidential Vote Share*; *% African American*;  $\ln(\text{Challenger Spending}) - \ln(\text{Incumbent Spending})$ ; *Challenger Quality*; *Freshman*; *Rate of Violent Crime*; and *Change in rate of violent crime*. To balance Democrats in years 1988-1992 & 2000-2004 it was also necessary to include an indicator for whether a representative was from a southern state.

Web Appendix Table 6. Standardized Differences in Means for Crime Placebo Tests

Democrats <b>Covariates</b>	1994-1998			1988-1992 & 2000-2004		
	Before	After	Improvement	Before	After	Improvement
<i>Turbo De-crimed ADA</i>	-1.178	-0.006	99.5%	-0.424	-0.019	95.5%
<i>Presidential Vote Share</i>	-1.383	-0.049	96.5%	-0.346	-0.032	90.8%
<i>% African American</i>	-0.470	-0.091	80.6%	-0.112	-0.044	60.7%
<i>ln(Challenger Spending)</i> – <i>ln(Incumbent Spending)</i>	0.235	0.005	97.9%	-0.092	-0.042	54.3%
<i>Challenger Quality</i>	0.218	0	100.0%	0.036	0.061	-69.4%
<i>Freshman</i>	-0.536	0	100.0%	0.120	0	100.0%
<i>Rate of Violent Crime</i>	-0.191	-0.059	69.1%	-0.634	-0.026	95.9%
<i>Change in</i> <i>Rate of Violent Crime</i>	0.119	-0.004	96.6%	-0.499	0.016	96.8%
<i>South</i>	n/a	n/a	n/a	0.268	0	100.0%
<b>Propensity Score</b>	0.855	0.034	96.0%	0.860	0.047	94.5%

Republicans <b>Covariates</b>	1994-1998			1988-1992 & 2000-2004		
	Before	After	Improvement	Before	After	Improvement
<i>Turbo De-crimed ADA</i>	0.802	-0.019	97.6%	0.460	0.002	99.6%
<i>Presidential Vote Share</i>	-0.228	-0.003	98.7%	-0.490	-0.091	81.4%
<i>% African American</i>	-0.002	-0.001	50.0%	-0.038	0.098	-157.9%
<i>ln(Challenger Spending)</i> – <i>ln(Incumbent Spending)</i>	-0.123	-0.120	2.4%	0.208	-0.075	63.9%
<i>Challenger Quality</i>	-0.069	0	100.0%	-0.001	0.009	-800.0%
<i>Freshman</i>	--0.034	0.036	-5.9%	-0.009	0.112	-1144.4%
<i>Rate of Violent Crime</i>	0.233	0.038	83.7%	0.079	0.139	-75.9%
<i>Change in</i> <i>Rate of Violent Crime</i>	0.289	0.001	99.7%	0.119	0.054	54.6%
<b>Propensity Score</b>	0.840	0.014	98.3%	0.524	0.001	99.8%

Web Appendix Table 7. Rosenbaum (2002) Sensitivity Analysis for Crime

	Estimate (Std. Err.)	Sensitivity Minimum $\Gamma$ 's
	[1]	[2]
<b>Democrats</b>		
1994-1998	0.063 (0.018)	2.02 5.05
1988-1992 & 2000-2004	-0.007 (0.005)	1.20 1.13
<b>Republicans</b>		
1994-1998	0.014 (0.010)	1.17 1.37
1988-1992 & 2000-2004	-0.006 (0.006)	1.25 1.10

This method hypothesizes that, conditional on observed covariates, members of Congress who are in the treated group are  $\Gamma$  times as likely as others to be in the treated group for unobserved reasons, and then analyzes how estimates change as  $\Gamma$  increases. Column 2 of the table reports the results of two tests. The first number is the minimum value of  $\Gamma$  at which the p-value of a Wilcoxon signed rank test (a nonparametric alternative to the paired *t*-test) crosses the .05 significance threshold. The second number is the minimum  $\Gamma$  at which the Hodges-Lehmann confidence interval (roughly, the difference in medians) brackets 0. In both cases, larger values indicate less sensitivity of the results to potential (but undetectable) violation of selection on observables. Both tests are presented to allow the reader to evaluate how sensitive any particular analysis is to this assumption. These sensitivity tests suggest that the results are robust to a fair amount of hidden bias in the data. For example, even if unobserved covariates led some Democrats in high salience years to vote tough on crime at a rate of 2.02 times as much as others, the accountability effect would remain significant.



Web Appendix Table 8. OLS Control Variable Results for Environment

		<b>Democrats</b>								
		1988	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004
	<i>De-LCVed ADA</i>	-0.128 (0.042)	-0.083 (0.037)	-0.091 (0.041)	-0.122 (0.034)	-0.187 (0.040)	-0.203 (0.046)	-0.093 (0.047)	-0.036 (0.054)	-0.049 (0.040)
	<i>Presidential Vote Share</i>	0.436 (0.058)	0.362 (0.064)	0.489 (0.071)	0.584 (0.061)	0.656 (0.049)	0.554 (0.054)	0.553 (0.043)	0.506 (0.053)	0.549 (0.065)
	<i>% African American</i>	0.031 (0.035)	0.117 (0.036)	0.077 (0.037)	0.028 (0.026)	0.007 (0.022)	0.013 (0.024)	-0.012 (0.023)	0.024 (0.030)	0.016 (0.028)
	<i>ln(Challenger Spending)</i> <i>- ln(Incumbent Spending)</i>	-0.029 (0.004)	-0.019 (0.003)	-0.031 (0.004)	-0.03 (0.003)	-0.027 (0.003)	-0.029 (0.003)	-0.026 (0.003)	-0.025 (0.003)	-0.022 (0.002)
	<i>Challenger Quality</i>	0.014 (0.014)	-0.029 (0.014)	-0.017 (0.120)	-0.025 (0.011)	-0.021 (0.010)	-0.025 (0.010)	-0.013 (0.009)	-0.008 (0.013)	0.005 (0.012)
	<i>Freshman</i>	-0.017 (0.015)	0.006 (0.018)	0.047 (0.014)	-0.013 (0.009)	-0.003 (0.013)	-0.014 (0.010)	-0.018 (0.011)	0.01 (0.016)	0.002 (0.014)
	Constant	0.475 (0.023)	0.458 (0.028)	0.339 (0.029)	0.274 (0.025)	0.357 (0.023)	0.416 (0.028)	0.413 (0.022)	0.376 (0.031)	0.359 (0.035)
N		187	195	192	205	158	148	170	154	159
R <sup>2</sup>		0.614	0.537	0.595	0.743	0.849	0.830	0.830	0.726	0.762
		<b>Republicans</b>								
	<i>De-LCVed ADA</i>	0.158 (0.044)	0.131 (0.060)	0.202 (0.059)	0.12 (0.066)	-0.05 (0.050)	0.198 (0.061)	0.052 (0.052)	-0.04 (0.066)	0.127 (0.054)
	<i>Presidential Vote Share</i>	-0.458 (0.082)	-0.205 (0.106)	-0.491 (0.073)	-0.256 (0.073)	-0.521 (0.044)	-0.423 (0.070)	-0.381 (0.050)	-0.355 (0.064)	-0.522 (0.056)
	<i>% African American</i>	-0.06 (0.066)	-0.027 (0.073)	0.025 (0.102)	0.024 (0.074)	-0.02 (0.038)	-0.09 (0.054)	-0.036 (0.035)	-0.008 (0.053)	-0.011 (0.043)
	<i>ln(Challenger Spending)</i> <i>- ln(Incumbent Spending)</i>	-0.035 (0.004)	-0.03 (0.004)	-0.022 (0.003)	-0.027 (0.003)	-0.03 (0.002)	-0.021 (0.003)	-0.025 (0.002)	-0.023 (0.002)	-0.015 (0.002)
	<i>Challenger Quality</i>	-0.006 (0.012)	-0.026 (0.016)	-0.028 (0.012)	-0.017 (0.012)	-0.017 (0.007)	-0.023 (0.010)	-0.011 (0.007)	-0.01 (0.011)	-0.009 (0.009)
	<i>Freshman</i>	-0.014 (0.013)	-0.015 (0.019)	0.016 (0.013)	-0.007 (0.009)	-0.039 (0.006)	-0.003 (0.012)	-0.005 (0.010)	-0.016 (0.012)	-0.013 (0.009)
	Constant	0.786 (0.050)	0.613 (0.065)	0.79 (0.043)	0.762 (0.041)	0.826 (0.025)	0.797 (0.040)	0.75 (0.031)	0.749 (0.039)	0.818 (0.035)
N		143	122	123	118	199	151	164	152	172
R <sup>2</sup>		0.624	0.463	0.584	0.565	0.809	0.567	0.725	0.619	0.556

Notes: Each entry reports the coefficient and the robust estimate of its standard error. Note that *De-LCVed ADA* should have an opposite effect according to party because a higher score reflects a more liberal member.

Web Appendix Table 9. Placebo Tests: The Effect of *LCV* on *Lagged Vote Share*

	<b>Placebo Estimate (Std. Err.)</b>	<b>Fitness Value</b>	<b>Std. Diff. in Propensity Score Means</b>	<b>Total <i>n</i> Treated <i>n</i></b>
<b>Democrats in Years</b>	<b>[5]</b>	<b>[2]</b>	<b>[3]</b>	<b>[4]</b>
1996 & 2002	-0.018 (0.017)	0.194	0.084	287 43
1988-1994, 1998, 2000, & 2004	-0.022 (0.014)	0.450	0.004	944 134
<b>Republicans In Years</b>				
1996 & 2002	0.014 (0.028)	0.153	0.070	311 40
1988-1994, 1998, 2000, & 2004	0.018 (0.020)	0.207	0.016	750 132

Notes: All analyses include as co-variables *De-LCVed ADA*, which is adjusted to be used across Congresses by the Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder (1999) method; *Presidential Vote Share*; *% African American*;  $\ln(\text{Challenger Spending}) - \ln(\text{Incumbent Spending})$ ; *Challenger Quality*; and *Freshman*.

Web Appendix Table 10. Standardized Differences in Means for Environment Placebo Tests

Democrats Covariates	1996 & 2002			1988-1994, 1998 & 2004		
	Before	After	Improvement	Before	After	Improvement
<i>Turbo De-LCVed ADA</i>	-1.649	-0.010	99.4%	-1.606	-0.002	99.9%
<i>Presidential Vote Share</i>	-1.837	-0.112	93.9%	-1.388	-0.030	97.8%
<i>% African American</i>	-0.419	0.051	87.9%	-0.192	-0.010	94.7%
<i>ln(Challenger Spending)</i> – <i>ln(Incumbent Spending)</i>	0.644	0.227	64.7%	0.204	-0.025	87.7%
<i>Challenger Quality</i>	0.132	0.073	45.0%	0.065	0.078	-18.7%
<i>Freshman</i>	-0.079	0	100.0%	-0.092	0.024	74.2%
Propensity Score	1.876	0.084	95.5%	1.596	0.004	99.8%

Republicans Covariates	1996 & 2002			1988-1994, 1998 & 2004		
	Before	After	Improvement	Before	After	Improvement
<i>Turbo De-LCVed ADA</i>	-1.809	-0.052	97.1%	-1.632	-0.017	99.0%
<i>Presidential Vote Share</i>	-1.546	-0.243	84.3%	-0.761	0.033	95.7%
<i>% African American</i>	0.183	0.058	68.4%	0.228	0.050	77.9%
<i>ln(Challenger Spending)</i> – <i>ln(Incumbent Spending)</i>	0.080	0.059	26.0%	0.008	-0.036	-371.9%
<i>Challenger Quality</i>	0.026	0.236	-810.9%	0.021	0.147	-591.6%
<i>Freshman</i>	-0.284	0.195	31.3%	-0.259	0	100.0%
Propensity Score	1.922	0.070	96.4%	1.640	0.016	99.0%

Web Appendix Table 11. Rosenbaum (2002) Sensitivity Analysis for the Environment

	<b>Estimate (Std. Err.)</b>	<b>Sensitivity Minimum Γ's</b>
	<b>[1]</b>	<b>[2]</b>
<b>Democrats</b>		
1996 & 2002	0.008 (0.012)	1.67 1.02
1988-1994, 1998, 2000, & 2004	0.009 (0.010)	1.14 1.18
<b>Republicans</b>		
1996 & 2002	0.013 (0.023)	1.38 1.31
1988-1994, 1998, 2000, & 2004	-0.018 (0.010)	1.19 1.62